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this type of ﬁnancial arrangement for the transport sector in Europe. We examine how the scope of the PPP in
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Europe is at present confronted by the increasing necessity to in-
vest in its infrastructure stocks; such investments will be directed to
infrastructure renewal and rehabilitation, above all in the original
member states of the EU, and to construction and development of
new infrastructure in the most recent member states. Two strong
concerns characterize European infrastructure investment; on the
one hand are the population trends such as the advance of population
aging due to increased life expectancy and decline of birth rates and
the migration trends. On the other hand lay the environmental con-
cerns, which include the need to reduce energy consumption and in-
vest in smart city solutions. The development of critical infrastructure
such as transport is therefore part of the investment portfolio, not
only of European public authorities, but also of the private sector.
Given the current economic crisis, however,many European countries
are contendingwith twodivergent policies, theﬁrst ofwhich is that coun-
tries are confronted by the necessity to improve competitiveness byonaro@eib.org
Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences.
tion of Trafﬁc and Safety Scieninvesting in transport infrastructure (see, for instance, the debate on
high-speed rail investment in the UK). Secondly, several member states
are compelled to contain their public budgets. These two divergent policy
streams provide countries with a powerful incentive to explore alterna-
tive funding approaches to build transport infrastructure and provide
service delivery. As a result, there is a widespread interest in various
forms of private and public involvements that have been developed and
applied widely in the transport sector under Public and Private Partner-
ship (PPP) approaches [1–3].
Notwithstanding that the 27 EU member states differ substantially
in their social and economic structures and infrastructure endowment,
this should prepare us for the variety of approaches to infrastructure
investment strategy and ﬁnancing already in use [4,5]. Within this
context we need to keep in mind that member state governments are
characterized by strongly diverse administrative cultures and capabili-
ties and distinct legal and planning traditions. For instance, institutional
diversity in the transport sector is considerable, with countries adopting
different approaches with respect to user charges and ownership struc-
tures. But despite the differences, a framework for what are now referred
to as PPPs has emerged within the European Union. The approach is
certainly well established in the European Union; in fact, from 2002 to
2006 an average annual value of approximately 30 billion euros was
signed under PPP contracts.
Most EU member states and the European Commission regard the
PPP as an important tool for attracting additional ﬁnancial resources
for high priority investments such as transport. Many deﬁnitions of a
PPP are present in the literature, butwedeem themost suitable overarch-
ing deﬁnition selected by the European Commission, where PPP refers to
“forms of cooperation between public authorities and businesses, with
the aim of carrying out infrastructure projects or providing services toces. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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tion of the evolution of public works ﬁnancing methods, given the
variety of initial conditions, we can nevertheless observe a shift away
from conventional traditional models of transportation service delivery
(distinguished by hierarchical decision structures, vertical integration
in delivery, and relatively undiversiﬁed funding tools), to a more diver-
siﬁed ﬁnancial landscape. The objective of our paper is thus to delineate
the EU panorama of PPP markets, and to investigate the impacts of EU
institutions in the development and success of this type of ﬁnancial
arrangement for the transport sector in Europe.
2. Institutional diversity in Europe
Starting from the 1990s, the European Union had two principal
objectives: the achievement of the Single Market and of market
integration; and the preparation for the European Monetary Union
(EMU) (Fig. 1). To achieve these two objectives it was of prime impor-
tance to improve the physical integration among European countries,
and increase the accessibility of the peripheral regions by targeting
the network infrastructures — energy, telecommunications and trans-
port. In this context the construction of transport Trans-European net-
works (TENs) assumes a critical role for European integration.
The TEN policy identiﬁes 30 transnational transport corridors on the
basis of proposals frommember states. “The European Union must aim
to promote the development of Trans-European Networks as a key
element for the creation of the Internal Market and the reinforcement
of Economic and Social Cohesion. This development includes the inter-
connection and interoperability of national networks as well as access
to such networks” [3]. However, by 2003 only one-third of the network
had been built, and only three of the 14 speciﬁc projects endorsed by
the European Council at Essen in 1994, had been completed. Total
investment in the Trans-European Network Transport (TEN-T) during
the period of 2000–2006 was €859 billion. At present, the completion
of the TEN-T is estimated at €550 billion until 2020 [6]; it is for this
reason that private sector ﬁnance and the implementation of a common
PPP framework is now considered to be essential to the success of
TEN-T development.
Although nearly all the countries in the EU use PPP arrangements,
as we have observed, there are different ways of adopting this policyThe Single Mar
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Source: European Investment Bank.due to different cultures and traditions in planning and management
of public works, deﬁciencies in legal and institutional structures, and
political awareness and acceptance of the PPP concept. The UK has the
longest and most substantial experience in PPP agreements; other
countries have followed the British framework and developed pilot
procurements for many years. The twomain institutional frameworks
are (1) PPP unit at a central government level, and (2) the promotion
of PPP legislation. In relation to the PPP units, in certain cases these
units have only a consultative capacity, for example, Sweden, France
and Luxembourg; whereas PPP units have a more active role in pro-
moting and facilitating PPPs, for example, Ireland and the Nether-
lands (Table 1).
Table 1 depicts the different experiences among European member
states. Among transport investments, road is the most common under
PPP agreements, however, only in the UK and Portugal do road PPP
agreements have sufﬁcient breadth and scope to enable them to deter-
mine structural changes in the procurement procedure. In newmember
states, especially for highway networks, additional investment is neces-
sary due to the transition process, i.e. in order to satisfy EU standards.
The World Bank [7] has estimated a ﬁgure of €65 billion over the next
15 years for infrastructure investment in new member states, where
Poland has the highest need for infrastructure investment (€21.4 billion).
There are several determinants related to each country's PPP ap-
proach. One is the planning determinant, throughwhich transport invest-
ment planning is implemented according to the different approaches
which are, in various degrees, systematic. For instance, in some countries
such as Italy, investment decisions are seldom supported bymaster plans
or cost-beneﬁt analyses. Conversely, in the EU there are countries with a
strong transportation planning tradition – which is either project-
focussed on CBA, as in the United Kingdom – or emphasizes strategic
network development, as in France and the Netherlands. The different
approaches often contribute to the structure of the private intervention
and thus to the feasibility of a PPP framework and institutional arrange-
ment in transport investment.
Fig. 2 speciﬁes the various institutional arrangements in the European
road sector. The ﬁgure presents two columns dividing the different
projects in relation to approach chosen for the user charges (with tolls
and toll-free). The projects are listed in relation to the ownership of the
transport infrastructure (at the top, private ownership and at the bottom,ket & EMU
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uropean Monetary Union (EMU) and PPPs.
Table 1. A summary of PPP experiences in European Union member states.
Member states PPP unit Year Location PPP law Airport Ports/canals Heavy railway Light railway/bus Road
Austria O ____ ∃ ∃
Belgium/ﬂanders X 2002 Ministry of ﬁnance X (2003) ∃ # # ∃
Czech Republic X 2004 Independent _ _ _ # # ∃/#
Denmark X 2006 Line ministry X (2010) ∃ ∃ ∃
France X 2005 Ministry of ﬁnance _ _ _ ∃/# ∃/# ∃ #
Finland O ____ ∃
Germany X 2009 Independent _ _ _ #
Greece X 2006 Ministry of ﬁnance X (2005) # # ∃
Hungary X 2003 Ministry of ﬁnance X ∃/#
Ireland X 2003 Ministry of ﬁnance X # !
Italy X 1999 Ministry of ﬁnance X ∃ ∃ ∃ !
Latvia X 2002 Ministry of ﬁnance X (2009) # #
Luxembourg O ___ #
Netherlands X 1999 Ministry of ﬁnance _ _ _ # ∃/# ∃/#
Poland X 2001 Line ministry X (2005) # # #
Portugal X 2003 Independent X (2003) # # # ∃ !
Spain O X # # ∃ !
Sweden O ___ # ∃ #
UK X 1997 Ministry of ﬁnance X ! # # ! !
Legend
X: PPP unit existing/PPP legislation in place.
O: no dedicated PPP unit.
—: In some sectors speciﬁc legislation is in place.
__: Legislation being proposed.
#: Some experiences.
!: Substantial number of closed projects.
∃: Projects in procurement.
Sources: [16] PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), OECD (2010), UCL QASER elaboration.
85F.R. Medda et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 83–87public ownership). As shown in theﬁgure, several funding strategies have
been applied in some cases within the same country; for example, in the
UK tradition, public ﬁnancing has been implemented alongside BOT con-
cessions. But we can conclude that certainly since the 1990s the trend of
infrastructure ﬁnancing has shifted from traditional public provision
to increasing private participation.
3. PPPs in transport — some key features
Despite national differences, the rationale for developing a PPP
approach from the vantage point of the public sector is based on
the opportunity to attract additional ﬁnancial resources through theFig. 2. Institutional div
Source: Luigi Marcon,involvement of the private sector, thereby reducing pressure on pub-
lic sector borrowing and facilitating closer control of capital-spending
budgets. According to various researches [8–10] efﬁciency gains are
another important main rational for the use of private ﬁnance and
private sector skills. Linked to these gains is the possibility of inducing
an efﬁcient service management throughout the whole project life and
achieving design optimality to ensure minimum life cycle costing —
contract design is essential. Therefore, a paramount consideration over
the course of the contract is the strategy of transferring risk from the
public sector to the private sector. Risk is allocated to the partner best
able to manage it, and who is best equipped to minimize its costs. This
aspect assumes relevance, particularly in light of contract renegotiation,ersity in Europe.
European Investment Bank.
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tor during the contractual bids, and also by systematic optimistic over-
estimation of the transport demand [9,11].
The PPP approach can induce indirect effects related to improve-
ments in public sector management. In the partnership the public
sector needs to correctly evaluate transport demand, road capacity
and safety levels; and by so doing it prompts the private sector to
achieve best practice in terms of project design, management and
technical innovation. The public sector therefore beneﬁts from the
addition of new operators – for instance, specialists in construction
and management in transport infrastructure – and also new markets,
such as the emergence of a bond market for transport infrastructure.
The possible beneﬁts in a PPP agreement must nevertheless be
weighed against possible disadvantages. In particular is the risk that in
the case of uncongested transport infrastructure, the user charges nec-
essary to achieve ﬁnancial sustainability may diverge substantially
from the economically optimal price, which can represent a fraction of
the price necessary for cost recovery. The approaches to user charges
in Europe have been various. In some cases the decision has been to
adopt shadow tolls (as in the SCUTs project in Portugal); others have
adopted a targeted approach in applying real tolls.
Another issue of concern is the funding cost and thus the PPP applica-
bility. Some scholars have indicated that the ex-ante premium on
private ﬁnance in road projects is signiﬁcant and in line with the cost
overruns in road projects often observed empirically [12]. However, this
observed increase in costs generally indicates that a higher funding cost
is needed in order to compensate private investors for taking ﬁnancial
risks, which however, may be structured within an incentive mechanism
in the PPP contractual agreement [9]. Nonetheless, the judgment ulti-
mately depends on whether a reasonable and efﬁcient evaluation along
with allocation of risks to the private sector is achievable in the PPP,
and whether this risk allocation is appropriate from a welfare point of
view [8].
Finally, it is well-recognized that the transaction cost of transport PPP
agreements is higher compared to the transport projects supported by
traditional ﬁnancing mechanisms. This situation is due to the high costs
of negotiation and contracting and additional costs for monitoring and
regulatory systems. However, standardization has advanced considerably
in EU countries, in particular countries with long experience of PPP pro-
jects, as in the UK, where the transaction costs have decreased over
time [13].
4. Strategic aspects of transport PPPs — some illustrations
After the experience of a few toll-based estuary road crossing
schemes, the DBFO model (Design Build Finance and Operate) was
launched in the early 1990s in the United Kingdom as part of the Private
Finance Initiative (PFI). Key features of the DBFO are the application of
“shadow” rather than real tolls and that the private party – normally a
special purpose company – is responsible for the ﬁnancing, design and
construction of the project and its operation for a number of years. The
solution of the shadow tolls was at that time very innovative. The High-
way Agency, which is responsible for transportation planning, project
prioritization, and the selection of the company through a competitive
tender, secures debt repayment and any return on shareholders' funds.
The decision to use shadow rather than real tolls was justiﬁed on eco-
nomic grounds so that users would not be discouraged by the need to
pay for road access, but also by the fact that imposing road tolls in the
UK would have been excessively controversial and politically risky.
The risk transfer to the private sectorwas very high in the early exam-
ples, including not only trafﬁc risk but also delay and civil unrest risks
related to the environmental and planning obligations. The so-called
banding mechanism was devised essentially to facilitate ﬁnancial engi-
neering. Themechanismallows bidders to address trafﬁc-related revenue
risks by structuring their offers through variable unit payments – the
trafﬁc band – in order to achieve the revenue to match foreseen capitalcosts and maintenance costs. In a typical DBFO there can be four trafﬁc
bands with the lower band (applying when trafﬁc falls below a certain
capacity), priced at some amount as an availability payment, thereby
guaranteeing that the private sector covers the cost partly at least. More
recently, the payment mechanism has changed in ways that give more
weight to availability than trafﬁc capacity, particularly in infrastructures
subject to intense competition, such as projects in urban road networks.
The DBFO approach has evolved in various concession models in
other European countries. The German road concession model was
conceived in 1994 in order to allow off-balance sheetﬁnancing of trans-
port infrastructure. The approachwas essentially a pre-ﬁnancing device
with very limited risk transfer, where the main risk transferred to the
private party was a construction risk, i.e. cost and time of completion,
without any trafﬁc risk. Apart from the possibility of off-balance sheet
ﬁnancing, the main advantage of this approach was that public pay-
ments would be easily tradable on the ﬁnancial market and provide
an easy exit for the builder after construction, as well as additional
liquidity to the road construction market.
In 2005 new ﬁnancing models were introduced in Germany by
successive legislative amendments similar in substance to a private ﬁ-
nance approach; these were the A-model and F-model of PPP. Under
the A-model, a private party can take the construction, operation
and maintenance of a federal trunk road section for a period up to
30 years. The private investor receives funds from the public sector,
part of which can be raised through the revenue from the HVG federal
tolling system. Under the F-model, which has been applied thus far to
schemes like tunnels and ﬁxed crossings, real tolls can be applied. In
both cases the maximum amount of public subsidy is limited to a per-
centage of the overall project cost.
A further example of an application of the DBFOmodel to the trans-
port sector is in Portugal, where an impressivemassive shadow toll pro-
gram, the SCUT, was launched in the late 1990s. However, by 2004 it
became clear that shadow toll obligations for the public sector, estimat-
ed at €660mper year by 2008, were becoming overbearing and thus the
government now plans to convert shadow tolls to real tolls.
Interesting applications of the PPP contracts in the European Union
have been and continue to be projects where the public sector is able
to confer an existing asset to the private sector in order to optimize
risk allocation and achieve the success of the contract by fostering the
private sector capacity in efﬁcient provision, management skills and
entrepreneurship ability. Two examples can better clarify this concept.
The Vasco de Gama Bridge on the Tagus River is one the main pro-
jects of its kind recently implemented in Europe; its length is 12 km
(18 km with the connecting links to the trunk road network), 140 m
high central pylons, and 47 m vertical water clearance across the cen-
tral span. As a key infrastructure for the Lisbon metropolitan area, it
was built according to schedule andwithin the cost, and opened to traf-
ﬁc inMarch 1998, in time for the Expo 98 universal exhibition (this was
a key requirement in the concession agreement). Despite the complex-
ity of the project and the long preparation period, the need for a second
river crossing had been apparent since themid-1970s; the execution of
the concession proceeded smoothly with the international tender in
1992, the selection of the concessionaire in 1994, contract signature in
1995, and works completed in 1998.
The cost was approximately €900 m, covered by shareholder funds
for 12%, the Cohesion Fund for 36%, revenues from the existing bridge
during construction for 7%, a loan from the European Investment Bank
for 35%, and other sources for 10%. The strategic objectives of the PPP
contract were to stimulate development in northern Lisbon and to the
west of the metropolitan region (Montijo) in order to attract inward
infrastructure investment to the city, but above all to reduce the conges-
tion on the existing 25th April Bridge. The Portuguese public sector in
this case has conferred to the private partner the rights not only of the
new bridge but also of the existing asset with consolidated revenue
streams – in this case the existing 25th April Bridge – for the length of
the concession period. And indeed, the adoption of a uniﬁed concession
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Gama Bridge project, since this strategy was able to signiﬁcantly reduce
the revenue risk of this PPP project.
Another remarkable example of early European project ﬁnance is
the Prado Carenage tunnel in Marseille, which is especially interesting
because here again we have a successful PPP example of the public
sector conferring an existing asset to the private party. The project is
an “opportunistic” project which has exploited an existing unused
former rail tunnel which was converted for light vehicle use and fully
funded through private resources. This was the ﬁrst PPP project of its
type in France and the ﬁrst example of toll paying infrastructure within
a city. The Marseille municipality was the conceding authority and
the special purpose company was the Societe Marseillaise du Tunnel
Prado-Carenage (SMTPC), comprised by construction companies and
banks. Investment cost was approximately €175m, funded 15% by
shares and subordinated convertible debt and 85% by long-term loans.
Work began in 1991 and the tunnel was in operation by 1993,
ﬁve months earlier than expected. Public reaction, however, was
unenthusiastic and despite a 25% decrease in initial tolls, trafﬁc
remained well below the forecast (22,000 vehicles per day vs 35,000).
However, through a systematic marketing policy and diversiﬁed tariff
policy by the private agent in accordance with the Marseille local au-
thority, the trafﬁc targetwas achieved in year 2000. The Prado Carenage
tunnel is another interesting example of how problems assessing trafﬁc
risks, which are particularly troublesome in cities where users have
access to alternative non-tolled routes, can be overcome by using the
strengths and capacities of the public and private partners towards
the same goal: the success of the PPP contract.
At this point we can conclude by observing that, in the transport
sector in the European Union, the logic of “pure” project ﬁnance, with
project revenues associated to user charges as the only support for invest-
ment, is not always easy to apply. It is well known that project beneﬁts
only partly translate into the willingness to pay by ﬁnal end users. In
fact, project beneﬁts can spill into networkbeneﬁtswhichmaybedifﬁcult
to capture through revenue streams accruing to a conventional project
vehicle. In addition, trafﬁc and revenues can easily be vulnerable to sub-
stantial competition.
For these reasons, the intransigent approach to project ﬁnance typi-
cal of the early generation of PFI projects in theUnitedKingdom,with its
radical transfer of risks to the private sector and a negotiating attitude
perceived as excessively antagonistic by private sector operators, has
been replaced by a softer approach with a more realistic assignment
of risk to the private partners. But more importantly, the prevailing atti-
tude is to regard partnership as a long-term cooperative relationship for
which renegotiation of contract terms is acceptable, and where the na-
ture of the public sector contribution ranges from conferring assets to
providing guarantees, to contractual and regulatory measures.
5. Conclusions
It is interesting to recall how a senior speaker from the English Na-
tional Audit Ofﬁce compared the preparation of project ﬁnance opera-
tions in the Private Finance Initiative to the art of preparing a “fugu”
or moon ﬁsh, a very well known delicacy in Japan. Apparently, the ﬁsh
is a true delight but it contains a powerful poison, and if it is not accu-
rately prepared it will kill the unfortunate gourmand. The message
here is that although PFI and in general PPP deals do not kill, if they
are not well-structured they can cause considerable “pain” to careless
public promoters. Several European transport PPPs have encountered
problems, from the notorious Eurotunnel mega-project, to failures
such as the VAL-Orly urban rail connection, the Rostock tunnel, the
northern orbital in Lyon, and the Shefﬁeld Supertram, tomention a few.
The main potential beneﬁt of the PPP approach in transport as well
as in other sectors is its ﬂexibility in adapting the structure of incentives
and risk-sharing to the features of the project and to the economic and
institutional environments. But because of this ﬂexibility, it is perhapsunwise to seek a unique model of PPP that can be easily replicated
across sectors and across countries. The choice context – PPP or conven-
tional approach – is amulti-objective decision. And in practice, the pub-
lic sector agency has to achieve a judgment about the trade-offs
between the various, and sometimes conﬂicting, objectives.
For public sector promoters the difﬁcult task is to avoid PPP transac-
tions that end up as zero-sum games. An intelligent value for money
analysis should be an essential step in reducing the probability of nega-
tive outcomes. Unfortunately, systematic value for money analysis is
not part of the administrative practice in all European countries. How-
ever, particularly in the early phases of the process of creating a PPP
market, where price signals for PPP transactions, e.g., cost and credit
pricing signals, are not yet available, value for money should be seen
as an essential step of good practice [14,15].
Against these general conclusions, we can observe that the growth
and structure of the European PPP market in the transport sector has
been determined by several interlinked and mutually reinforcing fac-
tors that fall into two broad categories. The ﬁrst relates to trends in
the market for transport infrastructure services towards increasing
integration on a continental scale. Not only have construction compa-
nies been consolidating into larger companies active in several coun-
tries, but transport operators too have extended their operations
geographically. The second category involves the policy and institu-
tional environment, which has facilitated, stimulated and directed
the European PPP approach.
The impacts of the European Union have therefore been threefold,
of which the ﬁrst are institutional and regulatory changes such as pro-
curement directives aimed at harmonizing the European market for
concessions. Secondly, the EU has developed and disseminated “soft”
instruments such as guidelines for PPPs and promoted cross-national
networks of PPP authorities. And thirdly, the EU has promoted the
Trans-European transport networks (TENs) and a number of large-scale
cross-border projects. The EU Commission's proposal to partly guarantee
the debt incurred byprivate parties to fund cross-border sections of prior-
ity TEN projects may indeed encourage private investment through PPP
agreements. The result is amarket for PPPs that, although still fragmented
nationally, is developing a European dimension and attracting resources
from a variety of players. The European transport PPP market thus far
can be regarded as an example of how integration may be pursued. It is
a learning process in which the results are controversial but the essential
objectives and advantages are very clear.References
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